Sexology Part Two

Tuesday 11 April 2017.
 

Sexuality Part Two

The early nineteen-century has a special place in the making of western sex, in that sexuality’s contemporary meaning of possession of sexual powers, or capability of sexual feelings’ was fist conceptualized. The term sexuality, according to the Oxford English Dictionary first entered the English language in 1879.
There is a major difference between premodern sexuality and modern sexuality. The former sexuality may be seen as consisting of a number of more or less transgressive acts. While the latter sexuality is organized into categories that are saturated with meaning: whom a person desires can be assumed also to imply other details of their personalities and preferences. In spite of what is popularly presented, the key catergories used in sexology to describe and classify aspects of sexual life (like homosexuality, masculinity and femininity) are not universal but are highly localized. Sexuality is not fixed and certain, but is dependent in its relationships in a given society. Sexuality in individual societies is governed by its relationship to the relations of forces, the founding myths, the underlying tensions, and the insurmountable taboos.

But sexually as the preeminent personal referential frame is quite new historically. (Crawford, European Sexualities, 1400-1800, p. 4)

I want to concentrate on the relation between forms of experience and systems of knowledge, on the way in what we have come to call sexuality is the product of a system of psychiatric knowledge that has its own style of reasoning and argumentation. (Davidson, Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality, p.32 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

Let us start by looking at the history of the concept itself. Its theoretical roots lie in the valiant efforts of the early sexologists, in the last decades of the nineteenth century and the early years of the present century, to capture the essence of that mysterious but all-powerful force of sex by categorizing its diverse manifestations and thus attempting to make sense of its incessant flux. (Weeks, Jefffrey. Questions of Identity, p. 32 in The Cultural Construction of Sexuality by Pat Caplan.)

What, however, is sexuality? Given its changing meaning over time, what is one looking for in records of the past? The very term "sexuality" is a modern construct which originated in the nineteenth century. As we explained in our book, Intimate Matters, it is only in the twentieth century that American society became so "sexualized" that the term had clear meaning throughout the culture. In the contemporary era, Americans have come to use "sexuality" to refer to the erotic, that is, to a state of physical attraction to either sex. In the past, however, there was no language of "sexuality" per se. (Freedman and DEmilio, Problems Encountered in Writing the History of Sexuality: Sources, Theory and Interpretation, p. 163 in Same-Sex Cultures and Sexualities An Anthropological Reader edited by Jennifer Robertson.)

The argument that sex might have a history in which ideas and practices change across time and place is relatively new. Historian since at least the Roman writer Suetonius (c. 69-after122AD) have recorded sexual behavior, particularly that of the famous and powerful. Of course everyone knows that sex acts happened in the past-we would not be here otherwise. But far fewer people understand how much sexuality-a term encompassing the activities and values associated with sexual acts and behaviors has changed over time. At the present day, many consider sexual identity to be central to a person’s psychological make-up. Sexual identity worked rather differently before 1800. (Crawford, European Sexualities, 1400-1800, p. 3)

Against this backdrop, sexuality was invented. The term ’sexuality’, in its contemporary meaning of possession of sexual powers, or capability of sexual feelings’, first entered the English language in 1879 according to the Oxford English Dictionary. (Mottier, Sexuality A Very Short Introduction, p. 31)

“On closer examination the apparent polarity looks more like continuum. Caution is justified by the demonstration that medieval terms do not match modern ones: there is no medieval category which corresponds to the modern ‘sexuality’; that medieval terms such as ‘sodomy’ fluctuate and may include any non-reproductive sexual act, as well as sins which are not sexual at all. Nobody claims that medieval sexual identities were identical in all respects to modern versions. The disagreement is about what precisely constitutes a sexual identity category: how stable, how permanent, how recognizable it should be: whether it is recognised by medical, legal, religious discourses.” (Salih, Sexual identities: a medieval perspective, p. 116 in Sodomy in Early Modern Europe, edited by Tom Betteridge)

Connected with this new focus is the fact that nineteen-century psychiatry often took sexuality to be the way in which the mind is best represented. To know a person’s sexuality is to know that person. Sexuality is the externalization of the hidden, inner essence of personality. And to know sexuality, to know the person, we must know its anomalies. (Davidson, Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality, p.63 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

But when we talk about sexuality, are we considering behaviour or a set of ideas and, if both, what is the relationship between them? It is clear that in modern western society, one’s sexual orientation is a very important part of one’s identity. Perhaps this is because, as Brake (1982) perceptively suggests, gender here is not so much ascribed on the basis of physiological sex as of achieved sex, and a vital part of that achievement is sexual behaviour and identity. People are encouraged to see themselves in terms of their sexuality, which is interpreted as the core of the self. But what is sexual in one context may not be so in another; an experience becomes sexual by application of socially learned meanings. Our heads, it has been said, are our most erogenous zone. (Caplan, Introduction, p. 2 in The Cultural Construction of Sexuality by Pat Caplan.)

Realizing that sexuality is not a natural, transcendent, and universal phenomenon, that it is instead a cultural creation, Foucault developed a history of sexuality that tries to account for the organization of our culture’s sexual world. He has tried to explain the social forces that create our concepts of heterosexuality and homosexuality, of normal and abnormal sexualities. Exclusive homo- and heter-sexualities developed over the last two centuries as a form of social control, stigmatizing homosexuality and thus encouraging the population to live circumscribed heterosexual lives. (Pronger, The Arena of Masculinity Sports, Homosexuality, and the Meaning of Sex, p.88)

The nineteenth century has a special place in the making of western sex. The terms heterosexual, homosexual, lesbian, bisexual, sadist, masochist indeed sexuality itself all date from that period are found in the works of those who came to be called the sexologist, those who made a scientific study of sexual behavior. Following the great Michel Foucault, Arnold Davidson has argued that the nineteenth century saw an epistemological or conceptual shift, with the emergence of a new structures of knowledge and a new style of reasoning. The science of sexuality, he writes made it possible, even inevitable, for us to become preoccupied with our true sexuality. Thus our existence became a sexistence saturated with the promises and threats of sexuality. Both the word sexuality and our sense of it date from the nineteenth century: according to the Oxford English Dictionary.” (Phillips and Reay. Sex Before Sexuality A Premodern History, p.7)

Scholars of premodern Europe contested Focault’s assertion that sexual identity was a nineteenth-century invention. Some medievalists found assertions of sexual difference by sodomites, women, and non-Christian others. Several early modernists argued that ties between men created homoerotic identifications. Male friendship, urban areas for sexual liaisons, and homosocial environments all created habits of sexual identification outside of marriage or declared celibacy. Sodomite or mollies were considered sexual types, as were prostitutes and celibates. Early modern people did at times identify people by their sexual practices. The aggregation of sodomities in urban environments in the Renaissance was made possible by, and facilitated, sexual identity. (Crawford, European Sexualities, 1400-1800, p. 7)

In fact, sexuality is not fixed and certain, independent of any context; quite to the contrary, its position within a society reveals the relations of forces, the founding myths, the underlying tensions, and the insurmountable taboos. (Tamagne, A History of Homosexuality in Europe Berlin, London, Paris 1919-1939 Volume I, p. 3)

The concept of sexuality is not only determined by culture, but also by class and gender. (Tamagne, A History of Homosexuality in Europe Berlin, London, Paris 1919-1939 Volume I, p. 3)

Many of the key categories used in sexology to describe and classify aspects of sexual life (like homosexuality, masculinity and femininity) have been shown not to be universal but highly localised (Gagnon and Parker, 1995:11). (Harding, Sex Acts Practices of Femininty and Masculinity, p.13)

But sexuality, like gender, is socially constructed. For this reason, as Barrett has pointed out, sexual relations are political; and therefore they can be variously constituted (1980:43). In the next section, I turn to the discipline of anthropology, to consider whether cross-cultural comparison can shed any further light on the meaning of sexuality. (Caplan, Introduction, p. 10 in The Cultural Construction of Sexuality by Pat Caplan.)

Thus while premodern sexuality may be envisaged as consisting of a number of more or less transgressive acts, modern sexuality is claimed to be organized into categories which are saturated with meaning: whom a person desires can be assumed also to imply other details of their personalities and preferences.
Both theoretical and historical investigations suggest this formulation is more useful as a schematic clarification of terms than as a statement about an historical process.
(Salih, Sexual identities: a medieval perspective, p. 113 in Sodomy in Early Modern Europe, edited by Tom Betteridge)

In the period dealt with in this book, c. 1100-1800, there was sex but no sexuality. That is, modern preoccupations with the centrality of sexual habits, tastes or preferences (what are often termed ’orientations’, ’identities’) to one’s true or inner self were yet to emerge. (Phillips and Reay, Sex Before Sexuality A Premodern History, p. 7)

We argue that historians of premodern sex will be constantly blocked in their understanding if they use terms and concepts applicable to sexuality since the late nineteenth century. The keywords qualified in successive chapters - heterosexual; homosexual, lesbian, pornography - are products of a particular historical moment - modernity - and are best reserved for it. There is nothing at all revolutionary or exceptional about our analysis, although readers will see that it runs counter to the assumptions (assumed is the most accurate description) of many historians. If one attempts to understand the past on its own terms and to refuse to see sex and sexuality as somehow excluded from historical, specificity, and if so much about our world is different from that of Athens in the fourth century BCE, or France in the twelfth century, or England in the seventeenth century, we should not be surprised to find a fundamentally different sexual regime there as well. Sex, as so many others have also argued, is a historical construct.; (Phillips and Reay, Sex Before Sexuality A Premodern History, p. 8-9)

Normal Sexuality

Sexology, the study of sex, rather interestingly begins with the study of abnormal sexuality and not the study of normal sexuality. Just as interesting, some of the earliest sexologists themselves were practicing abnormal sexual behavior. Normal sexuality though not studied in the beginning was accepted as given and that sexuality was heterosexuality, for reproduction, bearing children.

The idea that sex shaped personality in fundamental ways was largely the work of such sexologists as Richard Kraft-Ebbing, Havelock Ellis, and Sigmund Freud in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. After describing a huge range of sexual expression as pathological, they defined penetrated sex between a man and woman as the only normal possibility. The shorthand identification labels we recognize, homosexual and heterosexual, not surprisingly appeared in the same period. (Crawford, European Sexualities, 1400-1800, p. 4)

In order to be able to determine precisely what phenomena are functional disturbances or diseases of the sexual instinct, one must also, of course, specify what the normal or natural function of this instinct consists in. Without knowing what the normal function of the instinct is, everything and nothing could count as a functional disturbance. There would be no principled criterion to include or exclude any behavior from the disease category of perversion. So one must first believe that there is a natural function of the sexual instinct and then believe that this function is quite determinate. One might have thought that questions as momentous as these would have received extensive discussion during the nineteenth-century heyday of perversion. But, remarkably enough, no such discussion appears. There is virtually unargued unanimity both on the fact that this instinct does have a natural function and on what that function is. (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses p. 15 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

The normal sexual instinct expresses itself in a definite personality or character; functional disorders of the instinct will express themselves as psychical anomalies. Since the sexual instinct was thought to partake of both somatic and psychic features, any functional abnormality of the instinct could be expected to manifest itself psychically. In this way, these functional disorders and psychology were very closely connected. As Albert Moll says, To understand the homosexual urge we should consider the genital instinct not as a phenomenon apart from the other functions but rather as a psychic function. (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses, p. 18 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

To be able to determine precisely what phenomena are functional disturbances or diseases of the sexual instinct, one must also, of course, specify in what the normal or natural function of this instinct consists. Without knowing the normal function of the instinct, everything and nothing could count as a functional disturbance. There would be no principled criterion to include or exclude any behavior from the disease category of perversion. So one must first believe that there is a natural function of the sexual instinct and then believe that this function is quite determinate. We might think that questions as momentous as these would have received extensive discussion during the heyday of perversion in the nineteenth century. But, remarkably enough, no such discussion appears. There is virtually unargued unanimity both on the fact that this instinct does have a natural function and on what that function is. (Davidson, How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, p. 74 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

With opportunity for the natural satisfaction of the sexual instinct, every expression of it that does not correspond with the purpose of nature i.e., propagation must be regarded as perverse. (PS, pp. 16, 52-53) (Davidson, How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, p. 74 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

Nineteenth-century psychiatry silently adopted this conception of the function of the sexual instinct. It was often taken as so natural as not to need explicit statement since it was the only conception that made sense of psychiatric practice. It is not at all obvious why sadism, masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality should be treated as species of the same disease, for they appear to have no essential features in common. However, if one takes the natural function of the sexual instinct to be propagation, and if one takes the corresponding natural, psychological satisfaction of this instinct to consist in the satisfaction derived from heterosexual, genital intercourse, then it becomes possible to see why they were all classified together as perversions. Sadism, masochism, fetishism, and homosexuality all exhibit the same kind of perverse expression of the sexual instinct, the same basic kind of functional deviation, which manifests itself in the fact that psychological satisfaction is obtained primarily through activities disconnected from the natural function of the instinct. (Davidson, How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, p. 75-76 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

This understanding of the instinct permits a unified treatment of perversion, allowing one to place an apparently heterogeneous group of phenomena under the same natural disease-kind. Had anyone denied either that the sexual instinct has a natural function or that this function is procreation, diseases of perversion, as they were actually understood, would not have entered psychiatric nosology. (Davidson, How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud]s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, p. 76 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

In the nineteenth-century psychiatric theories that preceded Freud, both a specific object and a specific aim formed part and parcel of the instinct. The nature of the sexual instinct manifested itself, as I have said, in an attraction to members of the opposite sex and in a desire for genital intercourse with them. Thus inversion was one unnatural functional deviation of the sexual instinct, a deviation in which the natural object of this instinct did not exert its proper attraction. (Davidson, How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, p.79 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

The medical analysis of homosexuality during the nineteenth century helped demarcate a clear boundary between normal and abnormal sexuality. Forensic medicine came to the aid of judges and juries trying to enforce the laws against sodomy by developing a stereotype for use in identifying homosexuals. (Mosse, Nationalism and Sexuality Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe, p 27.)

Since the eighteenth century, the norm has been a powerful force in the regulation of sex, restricting the normal sexuality to heterosexuality and the family. Sexuality outside of this norm became deviant sexuality and the object of severe public regulation. The authority of the norm was reinforced by the medical and psychiatric professions and by the enforcement of laws dealing with perversions, these replaced the authority of the church in the regulation of sexual behavior. (Pronger, The Arena of Masculinity Sports, Homosexuality, and the Meaning of Sex, p.86)

Disease

Sexology, the study of sexuality, is neither complete nor possible without talking about the concept of disease. Only as the concept of disease changed was it possible to have abnormal sexuality. Disease went from problems of some part of the anatomy, i.e. physical body, to include functional deviations of the sexual instinct i.e. abnormal sexuality.

It is convenient to divide the history of sexual perversion into three stages, each stage depending upon a different understanding of what these diseases were thought to be diseases of. It is perhaps best to think of each stage as characterized by a different mode or form of explanation, the third stage constituting a decisive break with the first two, since it inaugurates an entirely new style of reasoning about perversion.; (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses, p. 3 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

In the first, most short-lived stage, sexual perversion was thought to be a disease of the reproductive or genital organs, a disease whose basis was some anatomical abnormality of these organs. The second stage, although in clinical practice recognizing perversions to be abnormalities of the sexual instinct, insisted that the psychophysiology of the sexual instinct (and so of its diseases as well) would eventually, with advances in knowledge, come to be understood in terms of the neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of the brain. These first two stages of explanation shared a commitment to the anatomo-pathologi-cal style of reasoning. The third stage took perversions to be pure functional deviations of the sexual instinct, not reducible to cerebral pathology. Perversions were to be viewed and treated at the level of psychology, not at the grander level of pathological anatomy. The psychiatric style of reasoning emerged clearly and definitively at this third stage. (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses, p. 3 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

Of course, this three-stage structural partition does not precisely coincide with historical chronology; the three forms of explanation were often mixed together, sometimes even in the same article. But they are capable of being distinguished and it will help our understanding to so distinguish them. More specifically, the second and third stages are not separated by some exacdy datable dividing line. Indeed, these two stages overlap to such an extent that many of the psychiatrists who are most responsible for our current conception of the perversions were also strongly wedded to the dominance of brain pathology. So although for analytical and historio-graphical reasons we must carefully separate these last two stages, as a matter of historical account no such neat division will be found. (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses, p. 3 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

From very near the beginning of psychiatry’s emergence as an academic discipline, functional diseases were a recognized part of clinical experience. Theories about the neuropathology of the brain had no clinical effects; they were part of an almost useless conceptual space. So although we can, and should, distinguish between perversions as functional deviations ultimately reducible to brain disease and perversions as pure functional diseases, if we look at the descriptions of those who advocate these second arid third modes of explanation, they are practically identical. The real, break, the new style of reasoning, is to be located at that point when the sexual instinct and its functional diseases were introduced together. Functional diseases were diseases of something not an organ, but an instinct. (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses, p. 4 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

The appropriate way to understand the sexual instinct is in functional terms, not in anatomical ones. Without such a functional understanding, there would have been no conceptual foundation for classifying certain phenomena as perversions or diseases of the instinct. And Richard von Krafft-Ebing himself, as I shall show, understood the sexual instinct in this functional way; his pathological anatomy here is just so much window dressing. (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses, p. 13 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

And by claiming that the seat of the sexual instinct was everywhere and nowhere, he told us to look for its diseases everywhere and nowhere. This "everywhere and nowhere" sometimes had a more common name in psychiatric discussions it went under the name of personality. A functional understanding of the instinct allowed one to isolate a set of disorders or diseases that were disturbances of the special functions of the instinct. (Davidson, Closing Up the Corpses, p. 13 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

“The notions of perversion and function are inextricably connected. Once one offers a functional characterization of the sexual instinct, perversions become a natural class of diseases; without this characterization there is really no conceptual room for this kind of disease. It is clear, for instance, that Krafft-Ebing understood the sexual instinct in a functional way. In his Text-book of Insanity Krafft-Ebing is unequivocal in his claim that life presents two instincts, those of self-preservation and sexuality; he insists that abnormal life presents no new instincts although the instincts of self-preservation and sexuality "may be lessened, increased, or manifested with perversion.” (Davidson, “How to Do the History of Psychoanalysis: A Reading of Freud’s Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality”, p. 73 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

“I have tried to show that starting around 1870 a new style of psychiatric reasoning style of reasoning about diseases emerges, one that makes possible, among other things, statements about sexual perversion-about homosexuality, masochism, sadism, and fetishism-that then quickly become commonplace in discussions of "sexuality." The appearance and proliferation of these statements were a direct consequence of this new style of reasoning, which we could also think of, in Foucault’s terms, as the birth of a new discursive practice. So to write a history of the birth of nineteenth-century psychiatry by the way of the of a notion style of reasoning requires writing a history of the emergence of a new system of concepts and showing how these concepts are internally related by a set of rules to form a structured conceptual space. One wants to see what concepts, connected in what particular ways, allowed statements about sexual perversions that had never been before, and ultimately permitted, so I have argued, the very constitution of the sexual perversions.” (Davidson, “Styles of Reasoning: From the History of Art to the Epistemology of Science”, p.136 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

“Furthermore, a crucial part of my historical account has been to demonstrate that this psychiatric style of reasoning is to be contrasted with the anatomical style of reasoning about diseases. In the arena of the sexual, the anatomical style of reasoning took sex as its object of investigation and concerned itself with diseases of structural abnormality, with pathological changes that resulted from some macroscopic or microscopic anatomical change.” (Davidson, “Styles of Reasoning: From the History of Art to the Epistemology of Science”, p.137 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts)

“If we study the history of pathological anatomy, neurology, and psychiatry in the nineteenth century, we can begin to reconstruct some of the polar concepts that make up the two opposed styles of reasoning. We are presented, for instance, with the polarities between sex and sexuality, organ and instinct, structure and function, and anatomical defect and perversion. The first of each of these pairs of concepts partially makes up the anatomical style of reasoning about disease, while the second of each of these pairs helps to constitute the psychiatric style of reasoning. These polarities analytically differentiate two conceptual modes of representation, two conceptual spaces, methodologically parallel to Wolfflin’s polarities that distinguish two visual modes of representation. By figuring out exactly how these concepts combine with one another in determinate ways to form possible true-or-false statements, and by enumerating the kinds of inference, analogy, evidence, verification, and explanation that are associated with these conceptual combinations, we can reconstitute a full-fledged style of reasoning.” (Davidson, “Styles of Reasoning: From the History of Art to the Epistemology of Science”, p.137 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts.)

“In the psychiatric style of reasoning, perversion is located outside the boundaries of the will. It is a disease of the sexual instinct, psychobiologically embedded in one’s personality, and not legitimately the object of moral approbation or disapprobation. The opposite of perversion is normal sexual desires or appetites, which are similarly independent of volition. Indeed, one of the main functions of this concept of sexual perversion is precisely to separate this phenomenon from the domain of vice.” (Davidson, “Styles of Reasoning: From the History of Art to the Epistemology of Science”, p. 140 in The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts.)

Bibliography

Betteridge, Tom. Editor. Sodomy in Early Modern Europe. Manchester UniversityPress. Manchestor and New York, 2002.

Brady, Sean, “Homosexuality: European and Colonial Encounters”, p. 43-62 in A Cultural History of Sexuality Volume 5 In The Age of the Empire, Chiara Beccalossi and Ivan Crozier editors.

Caplan, Pat editor. The Cultural Construction of Sexuality. Tavistock Publications. London & New York, 1987.

Crawford, Katherine. European Sexualities, 1400-1800. Cambridge University Press. New York, 2007.

Davidson, Arnold I. The Emergence of Sexuality Historical Epistemology and the Formation of Concepts. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, MA and London, 2001.

Halperin, David M. “Forgetting Foucault Acts, Identities, and the History of Sexuality”, p.42-68 in Sexualities in History editors Kim M. Phillip and Barry Reay.

Harding, Jennifer. Sex Acts Practices of Femininty and Masculinity. Sage Publications. London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi, 1998.

McLaren, Angus. Twentieth-century Sexuality A History. Blackwell Publishers. Malden, Massachusetts and Oxford, Uk, 1999.

Mosse, George, L. Nationalism and Sexuality Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe. The University of Wisconsin Press. Madison, WI and London, 1988.

Mottier, Veronique. Sexuality A Very Short Introduction. Oxford University Press. Oxford and New York, 2008.

Nye, Robert A., Masculinity and Male Codes of Honor in Modern France. University of California Press. Berkeley, 1998.

Phillips, Kim M. and Barry Reay. Sexualities in History. Routledge. New York and London, 2002.

Phillips, Kim M. and Barry Reay. Sex Before Sexuality A Premodern History. Polity Press. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA, 2011.

Pronger, Brian. The Arena of Masculinity Sports, Homosexuality, and the Meaning of Sex. St. Martin’s Press. New York, 1990.

Robertson, Jennifer. Same-Sex Cultures and Sexualities An Anthropological Reader. Blackwell Publishing. Malden, MA, Oxford, UK, and Victoria, AU, 2005.

Salih, Sarah. “Sexual identities: a medieval perspective”, p. 112-130 in Sodomy in Early Modern Europe edited by Tom Betteridge.

Segal, Lynne. Straight Sex Rethinking the Politics of Pleasure. University of California Press. Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1994.

Tamagne, Florence. A History of Homosexuality in Europe Berlin, London, Paris 1919-1939 Volume I. Algora Publishing. New York, 2004.

Weeks, Jeffrey. “Questions of Identity”,p. 31-51 in The Cultural Construction of Sexuality. Editor Pat Caplan.


Signatures: 0

forum

Date Name Message